On 3rd June 2026, AMI welcomed Dr Hashem Morvarid to deliver a research seminar addressing one of the most theologically challenging puzzles in Twelver Shīʿī thought: the Problem of Ghayba, or the occultation of the Twelfth Imam. Drawing on the methodology of Islamic analytic theology, Dr Morvarid offered a systematic critical review of the major responses to this problem in the classical and modern tradition before advancing an original proposal grounded in the Qurʾān’s treatment of moral evil in Q 2:30–33.
Key Findings
Formulating the Problem
Dr Morvarid opened by presenting the classical Shīʿī definition of the Imamate — encapsulated in the formulation riʾāsah ʿāmmah fī umūr al-dīn wa-al-dunyā niyābatan ʿan al-nabī (“absolute leadership in both religious and worldly matters, in succession to the Prophet”) — as found in al-Mufīd, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, and ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī. On this account, the Imam serves simultaneously as a divinely-appointed political ruler and as the ultimate authority on Qurʾānic interpretation, Sharīʿa, and theological matters. Both functions, Dr Morvarid argued, require the Imam to be present and publicly recognised. The occultation of the Twelfth Imam therefore creates a genuine tension at the heart of the tradition: the very institution whose purpose demands presence is occupied by an Imam who is hidden. This is the Problem of Ghayba.
Critical Review of Major Responses
Dr Morvarid then examined four principal responses in the tradition, evaluating each against its own internal logic.
The first response— unseen presence — holds that although hidden from public view, the Twelfth Imam may continue to guide believers anonymously, appearing to certain individuals, correcting errors in creed or law, and protecting the community from misguidance. Dr Morvarid acknowledged the textual basis for this view in works such as al-Nuʿmānī’s Kitāb al-Ghayba and al-Murtaḍā’s writings, but argued that it faces two serious difficulties: reported encounters are virtually impossible to verify, and even if accepted as genuine, they are too infrequent to resolve the problem as stated.
The second response — psychological benefit — argues that belief in a living, hidden Imam who may reappear at any moment has a salutary moral effect, restraining believers from sin and drawing them toward righteousness. Drawing on al-Murtaḍā and al-Ḥillī, Dr Morvarid showed that this response faces a powerful objection: the same psychological benefit could in principle be produced by the mere belief that God might send or create such a figure at any time. The actual existence of a living Imam is not required to produce the posited effect — a point dramatised by al-Taftāzānī’s memorable analogy in the Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid, in which a subject refrains equally from crime whether a governor is hidden within the village or merely expected to arrive from elsewhere.
The third response — the cosmic role — associated with ghālī tendencies, posits that the Imam is not merely a social and religious guide but a necessary ontological presence, essential to the maintenance of the universe. Dr Morvarid noted that this account does, in principle, solve the Problem of Ghayba, since a hidden Imam could still perform a cosmic function. However, it generates a more serious problem by attributing to the Imam roles incompatible with core Islamic convictions about God’s exclusive sovereignty in creation and sustenance — a concern reinforced by the numerous aḥādīth in which the Imams themselves distanced themselves from those who held such views.
The fourth response — the spiritual role, associated particularly with ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī and Murtaḍā Muṭahharī — understands the Imam not as a cosmic agent but as a channel of divine spiritual blessing, inward guidance, and illumination (majrā-yi fayḍ-i maʿnawī). Drawing on Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s Shiite Islam, Dr Morvarid showed that this response avoids the theological difficulties of the ghālī position while remaining consistent with reliable Shīʿī aḥādīth. He adjudged it the most defensible of the four. Nevertheless, he proposed moving beyond it toward an account that is less esoteric and more directly anchored in Qurʾānic exegesis.
A New Proposal: The Imam as God’s Moral Reason for Preserving Humankind
The seminar’s principal contribution was Dr Morvarid’s original response, developed through a close reading of Q 2:30–33 — the passage in which God announces to the angels His intention to place a khalīfa on earth, and the angels protest by pointing to the capacity of humankind for moral evil and bloodshed.
Dr Morvarid argued that the Qurʾān’s response to the angels’ objection constitutes an implicit theodicy: God’s answer to the problem of moral evil. The key lies in the knowledge of the names taught to Adam, which serves as the divine justification for placing — and preserving — a morally fallible species on earth. After reviewing and evaluating three classical interpretations of “the names” (as the names of all creatures; as divine attributes understood purely theoretically; and as the names of the prophets and Imams), Dr Morvarid advanced a synthesising proposal: “the names” refers to divine attributes and perfections, but Adam’s knowledge is not merely theoretical. Rather, God granted humanity both theoretical knowledge of divine perfections and the capacity to actualise them through free moral struggle. On this reading, what justifies God in creating and preserving humankind — notwithstanding the moral evil this entails — is the existence of beings who fully realise divine perfections through that very struggle. These are the prophets and the Imams.
The implications for the Problem of Ghayba follow directly. If the hidden Imam’s theological significance lies in functioning as God’s moral reason for preserving humankind in existence — as the highest instantiation of actualised divine perfections — then this role can be fulfilled even under conditions of occultation. Unlike leadership, arbitration, and religious instruction, this function does not require public presence or social recognition. The Twelfth Imam’s hiddenness is therefore not a theological embarrassment but is compatible with what his existence is ultimately for.
Dr Morvarid concluded by addressing the objection that this account privileges the Shīʿī Imams without sufficient justification. He responded by noting that Q 2:30–33 explicitly correlates knowledge of the names with being God’s khalīfa on earth — a designation that Shīʿī aḥādīth consistently apply to the Imams — grounding the proposal in both Qurʾānic reasoning and the broader exegetical tradition.
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About the Speaker
Dr Hashem Morvarid is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Trinity University, bridging Islamic philosophy and contemporary analytic philosophy. He holds an MA from Ferdowsi University of Mashhad and two PhDs in philosophy — from IPM, Tehran, and the University of Illinois at Chicago, where his dissertation on Avicenna received an Honorable Mention for the UIC Outstanding Dissertation Award. He was previously a Postdoctoral Fellow at Johns Hopkins University, and his research on analytic metaphysics, Islamic philosophy, and Shīʿa theology has appeared in journals including Philosophical Studies, Synthese, and the British Journal for the History of Philosophy.
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